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TORTS-LIABILITY IN KENTUCKY FOR PERSONAL INJURY
TO AN UNFORESEEN PLAINTIFF RESULTING FROM A NEGLI-
GENT INJURY TO PROPERTY OF ANOTHER
It is fundamental that there are at least three elements essen-
tial to establish actionable negligence, (1) the existence of a duty
owed by the defendant; (2) violation of that duty by the defendant;
and (3) damage resulting from violation of that duty1 It is also
fundamental that the absence of any one of these three elements
renders the petition bad, or the evidence insufficient. There is,
however, much confusion in determimng liability when the situa-
tion involves a plaintiff who is not readily apparent. Under such
circumstances the reasoning of the courts has, in the main, devel-
oped along two lines:
(1) Some employ the language of "proximate cause" with
limitation of liability being determined by the confusion of ordi-
nary and natural course of events, remoteness in time and space,
efficient intervening cause, foreseeability of intervening cause, etc.
(2) The second view is that the act must violate a duty owing
to the plaintiff, as an individual or member of a class, and holds
that there is no liability for negligence unless there is in the par-
ticular case a legal duty owed to the plaintiff or to the class.
The latter position was ably expounded by Justice Cardozo in
the leading case of Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co. In that case the
servant of the defendant railroad, in assisting a passenger to board a
moving train, knocked a package from the passenger's hands which
package, unknown to the servant, contained fireworks. The fire-
works exploded and the concussion dislodged a scale which fell upon
and injured the plaintiff, who was standing on the railroad platform
some distance away The court, in denying recovery held that the
plaintiff could not recover as the vicarious beneficiary of a breach
of duty to another. Under this view there is a fairly definite bound-
ary, capable of application, to the liability of the defendant, in that
there must be an act foreseeably dangerous to an interest of the
plaintiff. There is an interesting suggestion in the Palsgraf case P that
1 Warfield Natural Gas Co. v Allen, 248 Ky 646, 59 S.W 2d 534
(1933) Horse Creek Mining Co. v Frazeir's Adm'x., 224 Ky. 211, 5
S.W 2d 1064 (1928) Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Cash's Adm'x., 221
Ky 655, 299 S.W 590 (1927) Gosney v. Louisville & Nashville Ry.
Co., 169 Ky 323, 183 S.W 538 (1916).
2 Gosney v. Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co., 169 Ky. 323, 183 S.W
538 (1916).
'Miller v Gooding Highway Distr. 55 Idaho 258, 41 P 2d 625
(1935) Gordon v Bedard, 265 Mass. 408, 164 N.E. 374 (1929)
'248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
Id. at 346-347, 162 N.E. at 101.
STUDENT NOTES AND COMMENTS 337
if the defendant could have foreseen injury only to the package he
might not be liable for any injury to the person.
It is the purpose of this note to consider the attitude of the Ken-
tucky courts toward these two theories, as related to negligence
toward a plaintiff not readily apparent, and especially in the situa-
tion where injury to property might be foreseen, but not the result-
ing injury to a person.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky has never expressly adopted
or rejected the rule of the Palsgraf case. It has, in fact, been referred
to only once by the court, which quoted a portion not containing the
decision of the case.' A study of the Kentucky cases indicates, how-
ever, that the "duty" approach has only occasionally been used;
usually the court talks in terms of "proximate cause" though this
term is sometimes used interchangeably with "foreseeability"
Where the injury is the direct result of immediate negligence
to a known or readily foreseeable plaintiff, there is liability for the
injury regardless of whether the particular consequences were fore-
seeable. Here the type or extent of the injury and the manner of oc-
currence have no relation to foreseeability, which is not at issue. The
familiar situation illustrating this is the ordinary automobile colli-
sion where, if the defendant w~as negligent at all, he will be held to
have foreseen, necessarily, the injury to the occupants of the other
automobile, resulting directly from the collision. The defendant's act
is the "proximate" cause of any injuries, foreseeable or not.
Where, however, the'injury is remote in point of time or space,
or where there is an intervening cause which more directly produces
the injury, the courts again require that the injury be the "proxi-
mate" result of the defendant's negligence. But here the determina-
tion of whether or not the act of the defendant was the "proxinate"
cause of the injury to the plaintiff depends on the foreseeability of
the result.
A recent case, for example, stated that "proximate cause is
otherwise defined to be 'that cause which naturally leads to, and
which might have been expected to have produced, the result.' ""
A more satisfactory statement is given in Dixon v. Ky. Utilities Co.
where, quoting from an earlier case, the court said:
"Some courts deny that the injury in order to be
the proximate result of the negligence 'ought to have
been foreseen in the light of the attending circum-
stances' but most of the courts, including our own,
incorporate that element in the definition. The confu-
sion seems to have grown out of the failure to distin-
guish between an injury directly prQduced by the negli-
gence complained of and one which is indirectly or re-
'Lousville & N. R. R. v. Vaughn, 292 Ky 120, 126, 166 S.W 2d
43, 47 (1942).
'Hooks v. Cornett Lewis Coal Co., 260 Ky 778, 785, 86 S.W 2d
697, 700 (1935).
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motely produced. If the injury is the direct result of
the alleged negligence, the latter may be said in all
cases to be the proximate cause of the injury, although
it may not have been foresedn in the light of the at-
tending circumstances. If, however, the injury is only
the indirect or remote result of the alleged negligence,
then it must have been foreseen or anticipated in the
light of the circumstances." '
The rule applied in Kentucky, then, at least in most situations,
may be stated thus:
1. If the injury is the "direct" result of defendant's negligence,
he is liable therefor, though the injury which actually occurred
might not have been foreseen. This would seem the true situation in
which to speak of "proximate cause."
2. If the injury is the "indirect" result of defendant's negli-
gence, as where another act occurs between the negligence of de-
fendant and the actual injury, liability will depend on "foresee-
ability" 1
Neither of these rules takes into account the situation involving
the unforeseeable plaintiff, which was the problem before the New
York Court in the Palsgraf case. What does the Kentucky court
mean by "negligence"-negligence in the air, which Cardozo says
"will not do," or negligence as breach of duty to a particular plain-
tiff? The defendant engages in conduct which is socially undesirable,
because it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to A. If injury to
A is a direct result, defendant is liable for all the consequences,
whether he could foresee them or not, and "duty" may be readily
assumed. If injury to A results indirectly, defendant's liability de-
pends on the foreseeability of intervening forces which brought
about the injury But suppose injury to B is the direct result and
defendant could not foresee the possibility of harm to B. Shall we
apply the "direct result" rule and hold defendant liable to B, or shall
we relieve defendant of liability for the direct consequences of his
undesirable conduct by asking whether he could foresee harm to
B, i.e.,. whether he had a duty to B. It would seem simpler and less
confusing to deal with this type of problem in terms of duty. Con-
sideration of causation obscures the issue, which is whether the
defendant is under a legal obligation to protect B's interest.
A further complication arises if a distinction is made between
the interest in freedom from bodily harm and the interest in prop-
erty. If the defendant's conduct negligently threatens a property
8 295 Ky 32, 37,'174 S.W 2d 19, 22 (1943).
9Lousville & N. R. Co. v. Wright, 183 Ky 634, 210 S.W 184
(1919) Louisville & N. R. Co. v Daugherty, 108 S.W 336 (Ky 1908).
"°Dixon v Ky Utilities Co., 295 Ky 32, 174 S.W 2d 19 (1943)
Nelson Creek Coal Co. v Bransford, 189 Ky 741, 225 S.W 1070
(1920) (reversed on other grounds)
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interest of A, Cardozo suggests he might not be liable for injury to
the person of A. This distinction is adopted in the RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS,' but has been the subject of criticism." Suppose defendant's
conduct threatens harm to a property interest of A, but personal
injury to B is the direct result.
Some such problem was lurking in the background of a case
recently before the Kentucky Court of Appeals. In Meeks Motor
Frezght, Inc. v. Hams Adm'r" the defendant's truck was making a
delivery to a wholesale dry goods warehouse and, in order to reach
the warehouse, used a driveway which sloped sharply downward.
As the truck was driven into the driveway the driver and his helper
both noticed a paper box in the roadway ahead of them. The right
front wheel of the truck ran over the box and in doing so fatally
injured one of two small children who were inside. There was a
dispute in the testimony as to whether the box was moving at the
time, the driver testifying that it was not, while his helper testified
that he " saw the end of it just waving just- a little bit." 1 Sev-
eral children, one of them a bystander and another (a six year old
unsworn witness) an occupant of the box, testified that the box was
moving when struck which, if true, might be explained by the steep-
ness of the grade, described as "just a drop off."
The court, in reversing a judgment for the plaintiff, held that
an instruction on the ordinary law of the road was insufficient. But
the instruction given for use on a second trial, while apparently de-
signed-to leave to the jury the question as to whether, having seen
the box, the driver discovered or ought to have discovered that there
was some motion of the box as would place upon him the duty to
investigate and he failed to do so, actually is so worded as to indi-
cate that, having seen the box or having discovered or if he should
have discovered motion, he had the duty to investigate." It is inter-
"Sec. 281, Comment g.
" "If the courts once adopt such a distinction, then we are faced
with the terrifying prospect of a whole new series of cases in which
it will be necessary to consider whether or not a person has the
same interest in his foot and his eye, in his two adjoining houses,
in his ship and the cargo which it carries. Obviously a single dis-
tinction between bodily secu-ity on the one hand and property se-
curity on the other, would be too broad." Goodhard, The Unfore-
seeable Consequences of a Negligent Act (1930) 39 YALE L.J. 449,
467.
"302 Ky. 71, 193 S.W 2d 745 (1945)
"Transcript, page 124.
The instructions " should have stated that the defendant,
after having discovered the box in the driveway or by the exercise
of ordinary care and maintenance of a reasonable lookout, should
have discovered the box; and further, after having seen the box, or
by the exercise of ordinary care in maintaining a reasonable lookout,
did discover, or ought to have discovered that there was some motion
of the box as would place upon him the duty to investigate and in-
spect in order that its dangers may fully appear, and fails to exercise
L. J.-7
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esting to note that, while defendant obtained the requested reversal,
the case was never re-tried since, on the basis of the instruction
given by the court, the verdict would almost certainly have been fo 1
the plaintiff, it being admitted that the box itself was seen.
One month later another case involving children playing in a
cardboard box was before the court. In Gray v. Golde 1 the defend-
ant, in moving her .car from her driveway saw a large cardboard
box in the driveway, and stopped and removed it, together with
some pots and pans which had been left there by children playing
in the driveway. When she returned a short time later she saw the
box in the driveway again and ran over it, severely mjurmg a
child who was playing inside the box. The testimony of the defend-
ant indicated that she knew the children had been playing with the
box in the driveway, an element which was not present in the Meeks
case, yet the court, in affirming a judgment for the plaintiff, said,
"While this case is not free from doubt and is rather a difficult
one the judgment is correct." Based upon the fact that the de-
fendant knew that children had been playing in the box a short
time before, the court held that she should have anticipated that
they had replaced the box in the driveway and was therefore under
a duty to investigate.
These two cases, considered together, would seem to indicate
that the attitude* of the court at present is that a driver of an auto-
mobile who sees any object large enough to contain a human being
in front of his vehicle on a driveway or semi-public road, should
foresee that it might contain a human being and he is under a conse-
quent duty to investigate before proceeding. If the instruction given
by the court in the Meeks case be taken literally such is undoubtedly
the case for, strictly construed, it requires one who sees a box or sees
motion of the box, to investigate.
Without this literal interpretation, and adopting the meaning
apparently intended by the court, liability is determined by duty,
and duty imposed by the foreseeability of harm to the particular
plaintiff. There is always some risk of harm in running over a large
box, the contents of which are unknown. If injury to merchandise
in the box, to another occupant of the vehicle, or to the vehicle itself
resulted, liability might well be imposed on the driver. With such
considerations the court is not concerned in these cases. Liability of
the driver for injury to a child concealed in a box does not depend
on whether the driver could foresee some harm, somehow, to some-
one, but on whether he could foresee injury to the child, i.e. did the
circumstances charge him with knowledge (or duty to acquire
ordinary care therein, and such failure, if any, was the proximate
cause of the death of John Ham, Jr., the law is for the plaintiff."
Meeks Motor Freight, Inc. v Ham's Adm'r., 302 Ky. 71, 78, 193 S.W
2d 745, 748 (1945)
10301 Ky 477, 192 S.W 2d 371 (1945)
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knowledge) of the presence of a child in the box. It is not sufficient
to show that the defendant was guilty of "negligence in the air" and
that injury directly resulted; negligence consisting of the breach of
a duty to the particular person injured must be shown.
On several previous occasions the court has indicated that, in a
proper fact situation, it will make the same requirement of "duty to
the particular plaintiff" that is required by the Palsgraf case." The
most direct statement is contained in West Kentucky Coal Co. v.
Smithers' where the court says:
" it is not sufficient to show that there was
a violation of a duty owing to another person or class
of persons, which, had it been performed, would have
prevented the injury complained of. It must further
appear that there was a violation of a duty owing to the
plaintiff personally, or to a class to which he bore the
necessary relation to make the duty applicable to him
Facts which create a relation and therefore a duty
as to one, do not establish the same obligation to all
mankind "
The reasoning of the court in the Meeks case (and in the Gray
case as well) seems to indicate that the court has adopted the rule
of the Palsgraf case, consciously or unconsciously. That there must be
a duty to the particular plaintiff is assumed by the court; its only
concern is whether such a duty arose in the circumstances of the
case. It concludes that a jury might find in each case that the de-
fendant's conduct involved an unreasonable risk of harm to the
plaintiff's interest in personal security. It seems probable that the
court may now be considering negligence as the relation between
particular individuals; that it is not a wrong to third persons, and
therefore they cannot recover even though they may have been
injured by the act, unless they can establish the existence of a duty
owed to them by the wrongdoer.
GEORGE MUEHLENKAMP
See Brauner v. Leutz, 293 Ky 406, 169 S.W 2d 4 (1943)
(where the court held that, assuming defendant was negligent, there
still was no cause of action in favor of the plaintiff unless there was
a duty on the part of the negligent one toward the injured one,
since "actionable negligence is based upon the violation of duty owed
to the injured person by the negligent one.")
In Komonyi, Adm'x. v Consolidation Coal Co., 182 Ky 683, 684,
206 S.W 883, 884 (1918) the court stated, "It is not sufficient . to
show a mere general breach of duty, but it must appear that there
was a breach of duty owing to the employee who was killed."
8184 Ky. 211, 211 S.W 580 (1919) (But the court cites as au-
thority Garland v. Boston & M. R. R., 76 N.H. 556, 86 Atl. 141, which
involved the question of duty to a trespasser, an exceptional class
of case antedating the Palsgraf case and followed by courts wich
would reject the more generalized rule of the Palsgraf case.)
